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In this paper, we discuss Lepore and Stone’s account of metaphor which 
is based on three of Davidson’s proposals: (i) the rejection of metaphori-
cal meanings; (ii) the rejection of metaphors as conveying metaphorical 
propositional contents; and (iii) the defence of analogy as the key mech-
anism for understanding metaphors. Lepore and Stone defend these 
proposals because the non-sceptic strategy on metaphorical meanings, 
characterized in general by the negation of (i) and (ii), fails to come to 
grips with neither the power of metaphor nor the explanatory resources 
of traditional pragmatic theories. In this paper we show not only how 
our non-sceptic account of metaphorical meaning as a variety of ad hoc 
concept eliminates these diffi culties but also how it can solve two related 
diffi culties that appear in Lepore and Stone’s account. One of them is 
that Lepore and Stone’s account involves the possibility of interpreting 
all metaphorical utterances literally (metaphors only have one meaning, 
the ordinary meaning) as a criterion of metaphorical identifi cation; the 
other is that their proposal is not suited for explaining how speakers can 
agree or disagree when they use metaphorical utterances.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we discuss the account of metaphor proposed by Ernie 
Lepore and Matthew Stone in chapter ten of their latest book Imagina-
tion and Convention (2015) titled “Perspective Taking: Metaphor” and 
in two of their previous publications, “Against Metaphorical Meaning” 
(2010) and “Philosophical Investigations into Figurative Speech Meta-
phor and Irony” (2014). Following the lead of Davidson (1978), Lepore 
and Stone do not recognize any role for metaphorical meanings in a 
theory of meaning and reject that the interpretive effects of metaphors 
are propositional in nature. Metaphorical usage does not carry a mean-
ing its speaker is trying to communicate: there is no metaphorical com-
munication. This is not our position and we sometimes feel the titanic 
challenge to convince the sceptic that metaphorical communication is 
possible and can be explained if we take into account that metaphori-
cal utterances convey propositional contents, what is metaphorically 
said, that are explained appealing to metaphorical provisional mean-
ings, a variety of ad hoc concepts. These propositional contents are di-
rectly communicated, not implicated, much less intimated, suggested, 
or merely caused (Romero and Soria 1997/98).
At fi rst sight, our approach to metaphor is at the other theoretical 
end of Lepore and Stone’s scepticism towards metaphorical meanings 
but, far from what might be expected, we do not disagree on everything 
when dealing with their approach to metaphor. Thus, in the next sec-
tion of this paper we focus on the points of agreement and on the dif-
ferences related to our respective conceptions of metaphor. We agree 
on the crucial point about metaphor interpretation since we all defend 
the distinctiveness of metaphor and consider analogy as its key mecha-
nism. Nevertheless, our main point of disagreement is on their claim 
that the result of metaphorical analogical thinking is not part of speak-
er meaning. We present this proposal and the way in which Lepore and 
Stone articulate it in the third section. Our disagreement with it leads 
us, in the fourth part of this paper, to provide the arguments for our 
defence of metaphorical meaning. To explain our proposal, which we 
argue is more explanatory, we fi rst specify two conditions to identify a 
use of language as metaphorical: contextual abnormality and concep-
tual contrast. Second, we explain how the interpretation is achieved 
by means of a pragmatic process of context-shifting that affects the 
language parameter. The analogical mapping from source domain 
to target domain, which results in a metaphorical restructuring of a 
concept, permits us to construct provisional meanings for the words 
used metaphorically and thus the language parameter in that context 
changes. In this way, our pragmatic theory of metaphorical provisional 
meaning does not fail to come to grips with the power of metaphor since 
this meaning is conceivable only from the metaphorically restructured 
concept.
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2. Points of Agreement and disagreement
We agree with Lepore and Stone on several points. To begin with, we 
all defend the position that a theory of metaphor must specify the pe-
culiar characteristics of metaphor1 and what is distinctive about meta-
phor is that it is related to a distinctive process of perspective taking. 
Perspective taking in metaphor, or as we usually call it “analogical rea-
soning” (Romero and Soria 2014), consists in using information about a 
domain to organize the information about another domain with which 
it is not previously related and this is done through an analogical cor-
respondence (mapping). We then also agree that metaphor can issue in 
distinctive cognitive and discourse effects. As Lepore and Stone claim
metaphorical interpretation involves a distinctive process of PERSPECTIVE 
TAKING. Metaphor invites us to organize our thinking about something 
through an analogical correspondence with something it is not. (2015: 162)2
Secondly, we also agree that metaphor recognition (identifi cation) is 
essential to metaphorical interpretation. An account of metaphorical ut-
terances must include the features of metaphorical identifi cation. If (1)
(1) Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra and then sudden-
ly it fl ips over, pinning you underneath. At night, the ice wea-
sels come. (Example taken from the comedian Matt Groening as 
quoted by Lepore and Stone 2010: 165)
is a metaphor, (1) must be identifi ed as such. This identifi cation triggers 
its metaphorical interpretation. As Lepore and Stone claim “[w]e must 
recognize that (1) is a metaphor, and shape our psychological response 
accordingly.” (2010: 171).
For them, “the insights of metaphor and the distinctive import of 
words used metaphorically frequently go beyond the conventional rules 
of language.” (2015: 162). We agree that dead or conventional meta-
phors must be excluded from the study of the interpretation of active, 
creative metaphors (Romero and Soria 1998, 2005a, 2005b). Conven-
tional metaphors, following Lakoff and Johnson (1980)’s characteriza-
tion, are metaphorical utterances that include either expressions of 
1 Not all theorists have defended the position that there are some peculiar 
characteristics of metaphor. For example, Sperber and Wilson have stated that 
“there is no mechanism specifi c to metaphors, and no interesting generalization that 
applies only to them” (2008: 84). According to them, metaphor is interpreted in the 
same way as other loose uses. The inferential process is guided by the Relevance 
Principle and results in the loosening or weakening of the lexical encoded concept 
by dropping part of its logical entry in the process of arriving at the intended 
interpretation (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 233–237). See our 2014 for critiques to 
this view on metaphor.
2 This distinctive process has been argued by Richards (1936), Black (1954), 
Davidson (1978), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Kittay (1987), Romero and Soria 
(1997/98) and many others. Nevertheless, not all theorists argue for this process. 
For example, relevance theorists claim that the metaphorical mechanism is a case of 
loosening (see the previous footnote) and Stern argues for metaphor interpretation 
as a case of saturation of a metaphorical operator (Stern 2000).
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the used part of a conventional metaphorical concept or expressions of 
marginal metaphorical concepts that must be interpreted literally (or 
conventionally). A normal utterance of (2)
(2) The foundations of my theory are sure.
includes a used part of the conventional metaphorical concept THEORIES 
AS BUILDINGS: ‘foundations’. The expression ‘the foot of the mountain’ in 
an utterance of (3)
(3) We reached the foot of the mountain.
is the only expression used from the marginal metaphorical concept 
MOUNTAIN AS PERSON.
The usual utterances of (2)–(3) are interpreted literally. They are 
called “metaphors” because they give expression to metaphorical con-
cepts but they are “literal utterances” in the sense that they are identi-
fi ed as literal and must be interpreted literally.
For a literal proposition to be expressed, linguistic expressions must 
appear in normal linguistic and extralinguistic contexts. If we consider (4),
(4) [Sarah asks Marian where her pet is and she answers:] My cat is 
on the mat.
the context (linguistic and extralinguistic) of every word of the uttered 
sentence coincides with one of the potential contexts fi xed for them 
in the linguistic competence of the speaker. In cases like this, a lit-
eral use of language is identifi ed and the conventional interpretation 
is triggered. The same can be said about the so called “conventional 
metaphors”, about usual utterances of (2)–(3). They must be interpret-
ed literally although they involve conventional metaphorical concepts. 
Thus, conventional metaphors must be excluded from an account of 
metaphorical interpretation.
Novel metaphors instead demand a creative and distinctive process 
of interpretation. They are metaphorical utterances that include either 
expressions of the imaginative uses of conventional metaphorical con-
cepts or expressions of new metaphorical concepts. In an utterance of (5)
(5) His theory has thousands of little rooms.
‘thousands of little rooms’ is an instance of the unused part of a usual 
conventional metaphorical concept, THEORIES AS BUILDINGS. In an utter-
ance of (6)
(6) These facts are the bricks of his theory.
‘bricks’ is an extension of one of the used parts of THEORIES AS BUILDINGS: 
‘the outer shell’. Example (1) above is, according to Lepore and Stone 
(2015: 163), an unused part of a conventional metaphorical concept: 
LOVE AS A JOURNEY.3
3 The conventional metaphorical concept LOVE (AS A JOURNEY) inherits the structure 
of the conventional metaphorical concept LIFE (AS A JOURNEY). “What is special about 
the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, is that there are two lovers, who are travellers, and 
that the love relationship is a vehicle. The rest of the mapping is a consequence of 
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In addition, in an utterance of (7)
(7) Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children most 
of whom fi ght incessantly.
‘patriarchs who father many children most of whom fi ght incessantly’ 
calls forth the new metaphorical concept, CLASSICAL THEORIES AS PATRI-
ARCHS WHO FATHER MANY CHILDREN MOST OF WHOM FIGHT INCESSANTLY, which 
represents a new way of thinking. Any use of this concept is imaginative.
Finally, we also coincide in arguing that the special kind of perspec-
tive taking that characterizes metaphorical conceptualization is not 
propositional in nature. We maintain that analogical thinking delivers 
metaphorical concepts rather than propositions, concepts analogically 
restructured by means of the content of another: a conceptualization 
of one thing AS another. The imagery, the perspective we are taking 
on the subject-matter, as Lepore and Stone claim, does not proceed 
in many occasions constituent-by-constituent but across extended dis-
courses. Understanding a metaphor involves improvising correspon-
dences from properties and relationships of the source domain to cor-
responding ones in the target domain and the properties and relations 
of the source domain are often expressed by (simple or complex) expres-
sions in clauses and may extend across a longer text showing cohesive 
ties. In any case, the metaphorical vehicle (the part of the metaphorical 
utterance that is metaphorically attributed to its topic) can, but does 
not have to, be a single word. This can easily be shown with (7) where 
the metaphorical vehicle is ‘patriarchs who father many children most 
of whom fi ght incessantly’. Similarly, in (1), the metaphorical vehicle of 
metaphor is ‘a snowmobile racing across the tundra and then suddenly 
it fl ips over, pinning you underneath. At night, the ice weasels come’.
But not all are agreements. We also disagree on several issues. 
Even if our disagreement does not entail a direct confrontation with 
their claim below,
[w]e are defenders of grammar, of meaning, and of common sense. We are 
exponents of the richness of human experience and the creativity of lan-
guage. We believe in drawing useful and principled distinctions. (Lepore 
and Stone 2015: v)
their omission of pragmatics (based on inferential intention-attribu-
tion) is our main source of disagreement. We are not only defenders 
of grammar, of meaning, and of common sense, we are also defenders 
of inferential pragmatics. Furthermore, the introduction of inferential 
pragmatics in the agenda is, in our opinion, crucial to draw an account 
of how metaphorical meanings are conveyed as intended and thus of 
how communication through metaphor is possible. If we are right, the 
distinction between the metaphorical and non-metaphorical use of lan-
inheriting the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor.” (Lakoff 1993: 223). As we can see in this 
quotation, for Lakoff and Johnson the term “metaphor” stands for the metaphorical 
concept or for the related expression rather than for the metaphorical utterance 
which is the one we favour.
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guage does not depend on locating metaphor in the fi eld of imagination 
and out of communication.
In the literature on metaphor, we often fi nd a defence of the meta-
phorical mechanism as analogical mapping without denying a role for 
metaphorical meaning. Metaphorical meanings, if required for the cor-
rect explanation of the metaphorical use of language, have been con-
sidered as distinctive derived meanings that form a part of speaker 
meaning. Some theorists have considered that these derived or non-
conventional meanings are involved in what is implicated, others have 
argued that they form part of what is said. According to the fi rst posi-
tion, the speaker makes as if to say one thing in order to mean another. 
According to the second, the speaker means what she metaphorically 
says. In both proposals, a pragmatic account of metaphorical meaning 
as a result or as a by-product of analogical thinking is possible.
Following the Gricean notion of implicature (Grice 1975/89) and 
Black’s (1954) interaction theory on metaphor, Kittay (1987) elaborates 
her perspectival theory on metaphor with which she explains how the 
inferential analogical process reaches second-order meanings that in-
tervene in metaphorical implicatures.4 In contrast, we argue, following 
Indurkhya’s (1986) mapping approach, that metaphorical meanings 
are improvised from the analogical reconceptualization of a domain 
(target domain) by means of a partial mapping of information from a 
different unrelated domain (source domain). This metaphorical recon-
ceptualization of the target constitutes a new context of interpretation 
that delivers what is metaphorically said. A propositional content that 
includes what can be called, in Lepore and Stone’s vein, “improvised” 
meanings5 or, in our terminology, “provisional” meanings (ad hoc con-
cepts) for the expressions used abnormally (non-conventionally).
Lepore and Stone (2010) argue that, if the notion of speaker mean-
ing were developed coherently, there would be no room for any com-
municated propositional meaning in the metaphorical interpretation of 
utterances. In their opinion, the view of the metaphorical mechanism 
4 In general, we could say that the authors that have defended literalism in what 
is said have often argued for metaphor as implicature as well. In literalism, the 
sentence’s linguistic meaning (understood as a compositional meaning that results 
from the combination of the conventional meanings of sentence terms) is closely 
related to what is said by an utterance of the sentence and the contextual information 
that is involved in the latter is demanded by the linguistic meaning itself. Since the 
pragmatic contribution needed to interpret metaphor is not closely related to the 
conventional meaning of sentence terms, it intervenes in an implicature and not in 
what is said. Authors such as Stanley (2005) argue for this proposal.
5 Lepore and Stone (2015: 258) defend the idea that improvised meanings are 
possible as long as the speaker is able to specify and clarify this meaning enough 
for the purposes of the conversation so that it can contribute information to the 
conversational record. We think that metaphorical meaning is a type of improvised 
meaning, a case where conventions exhibit variation constrained by the identifi cation 
conditions and the systematic interpretation mechanism of novel metaphorical 
utterances.
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as analogical thinking is compatible only with the rejection of meta-
phorical meaning (Lepore and Stone 2015: 170). The previous propos-
als on the distinctive cognitive value of metaphor do not agree on the 
role of metaphor in speaker meaning. It can be formulated on the basis 
of the rejection of metaphorical meaning or on the basis of the discus-
sion of whether metaphorical meaning is involved in what is implicated 
or in what is said by an utterance. All these positions are currently 
defended, as we show in Figure 1, but the crucial issue of this debate is 
whether there are metaphorical meanings or not.
           Figure 1.  Theories on the distinctive cognitive value 
  of metaphor as analogy





What is said Romero and Soria (1997/98, 2007 and 2013)
In our opinion, the notion of speaker meaning, rightly understood, can 
account for non-conventional uses of language at the explicit level since 
the speaker meaning may include metaphorical provisional meanings. 
To argue for that, we are going to focus on the rejection of two of Lepore 
and Stone’s claims of their sceptic account on metaphorical meaning:
i. “(…) our insights in metaphorical thinking are prompt-
ed just by the literal meanings of utterances.” (Stone and 
Lepore 2010: 175, our emphasis). 
ii. The explanation of creative metaphorical meanings as a re-
sult of metaphorical thinking must be rejected because “this 
strategy fails to come to grips not only with the power of met-
aphor itself but also with the explanatory resources of tradi-
tional pragmatic theories” (Lepore and Stone 2015: 169).
To clarify why we disagree with these two points, we need to explain 
in more detail Lepore and Stone’s view against metaphorical meaning. 
3. Lepore and Stone’s views on metaphor
Lepore and Stone say, quoting Emerson (1836: 34–35), that “Man is an 
analogist” (2015: 171n5). They, as many others, accept that the power 
of metaphor consists in using knowledge of one domain to give a per-
spective on something else.
Nevertheless, unlike those arguing that the application of this 
distinctive mechanism results in a peculiar propositional content for 
metaphorical utterances at the level of speaker meaning, Lepore and 
Stone claim that the recognition of the distinctive value of metaphor 
necessarily takes us to deny metaphorical meaning.
[t]he information we get through a metaphor that comes from this process is 
not pragmatic, in the sense of not part of speaker meaning, not signaled by 
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the speaker or recognized by the hearer. It becomes an extension of the ex-
ternal world, a place where our perceptions and demonstrations can inform 
our thinking and interaction we do with one another, but not part of our 
communication, that is, not part of the communicative enterprise. (Lepore 
and Stone 2014: 83)
Their rejection of metaphor as part of the communicative enterprise is 
based on arguing that metaphorical utterances are used to draw the 
hearer’s attention to similarities. Speaker’s goal is to make the hearer 
see similarities not to assert them. The hearer understands the propo-
sition literally expressed and this understanding prompts him to look 
for certain similarities (Lepore and Stone 2010: 170 and 2015: 164).
Speaker meaning defi nitions developed by Grice (1957/89 and 
1969/89) or by Lewis (1969 and 1979) permit Lepore and Stone to 
show why they reject the alleged metaphorical meaning. The nature 
of speaker meaning is, according to Grice (1957/89), determined by a 
group of intentions aimed to produce certain effects by means of the 
recognition of speaker’s intention to produce them. The recognition of 
speaker’s intention to produce certain effects is a necessary condition 
for the audience and a reason to reach them. In positing metaphorical 
meaning, this must be identifi ed as part of what a speaker intentionally 
means and this requires, if we consider Grice’s defi nition, an audience 
to recognize a specifi c content a speaker wants to get across. Grice’s no-
tion of speaker meaning is of no use to explain metaphorical meaning 
because the hearer’s appreciation of the similarities is not achieved by 
means of the hearer’s recognition of that intention (they take this as 
a reason parallel to Grice’s reason to exclude Herod’s showing John’s 
head as an act with speaker meaning). The metaphorist has the inten-
tion that the audience appreciate certain similarities, but these are not 
reached by means of recognizing the speaker’s intention to get across 
a propositional content in which a metaphorical meaning is involved. 
Taking into account Lewis’ characterization of speaker meaning does 
not change the situation. Lewis (1969) characterizes speaker meaning 
as the speaker’s intention to coordinate with an audience to update the 
conversational record. Lewis considers not just speaker’s intention but 
also the kinds of situation where agents face signaling problems. In his 
approach, the speaker means a propositional content by uttering a sen-
tence if she intends to update the conversational record with that propo-
sition by coordination. In positing metaphorical meaning, this must be a 
part of what a speaker intentionally means and this requires the signal 
of the metaphor to be used as the basis for the uptake of that content. 
Nevertheless, when a metaphorical utterance is produced by a speaker, 
her audience and she do not add a propositional content to the conver-
sational record to satisfy their joint interests, including their interest in 
agreeing on the record. Once the utterance is recognized as a metaphor 
by means of the recognition of speaker’s literal meaning, they do not 
have a mutual expectation of agreeing on adding a metaphorical con-
tent to update the record, but of appreciating a similarity.
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The goal of a metaphorical utterance is “not for specifi c information 
to be exchanged, and interlocutors do not coordinate on the information 
itself or derive it directly by intention recognition.” (Lepore and Stone 
2010: 171). The speaker has a distinctive metaphorical thought but the 
hearer just gets the literal (absurd, irrational) linguistic meaning. If we 
reason from it, we would just rediscover the absurdity. The essential 
aspects of this activity cannot be characterized in terms of a commu-
nicative enterprise because although the literal proposition is made 
public, it cannot be considered as information to update the record. In 
their words:
metaphors can shape our responses and guide our thinking, because of the 
particular kind of perspective taking they involve, without conveying infor-
mation in the usual sense. This, more than anything else, is why we think 
metaphors must be explained in a distinctive way. (2015: 169)
Meaning or information is, for them, public content that underwrit-
ers interlocutors’ joint inquiry into how things are. As there is “little 
evidence that metaphor ever contributes information in the sense of 
publicly accessible content that supports inquiry” (Lepore and Stone 
2015: 170), they conclude metaphors do not contribute propositional 
content even if the speaker intended the hearer to focus on a series of 
similarities. These similarities are not part of any propositional con-
tent communicated by the speaker. Rather, they are part of the inter-
pretive effects delivered by propositional content which is in no way 
special or metaphorical but literal. The literal meaning of the sentence 
uttered metaphorically prompts the similarity but does not underwrite 
interlocutors’ joint inquiry into how things are. The hearer is invited 
to explore the implications of seeing one thing as another by using his 
imagination.
To support the plausibility of this view of metaphor they resort to 
a parallelism between metaphors and jokes. Speaker’s goal to utter 
both jokes and metaphors is not to assert any propositional content it 
is rather to show some imagery. The comedian’s utterance provides us 
with a humorous imagery but does not deliver any information that 
contributes to inquiry. Correspondingly, the metaphorist’s utterance 
prompts the hearer’s perception of a similarity but he is not informed 
of anything to update the conversational record.
These and other cases of “imagination” are taken as evidence that 
there is no room for the sort of communication based on reasoning and 
intention recognition. They reject the Gricean intentional framework 
to characterize interpretation as they think (i) that interpretive rea-
soning is more diverse and (ii) that linguistic meaning is broader in 
scope than Grice envisioned (Lepore and Stone 2015: 6). In their view, 
any traditional pragmatic account involves a reduction of meaning to 
communicative intention. As this is incompatible with (i) and (ii), they 
reject any pragmatic account of metaphor. They admit that intention 
recognition is necessary for all collaboration but
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interlocutors’ contributions to conversation—just like their contributions 
to practical activity—carry things forward according to a dynamic that is 
antecedent to their intentions, and independent of them. (Lepore and Stone 
2015: 6)
They consider it a mistake, therefore, that “the theory of CIs [conversa-
tional implicatures] eliminates the need to describe linguistic conven-
tions and imaginative mechanisms in detail.” (2015: 6). The inferential 
mechanisms recruited in language interpretation are quite diverse and 
eclectic and “it follows that overarching frameworks like the Coopera-
tive Principle or the Principle of Relevance can’t be the whole story.” 
(2015: 83). A unitary account of all of the inferential mechanisms is not 
possible. They also claim that “the category of conversational implica-
ture does no theoretical work. Pragmatics can be, at most, a theory of 
disambiguation; pragmatic reasoning never contributes content to ut-
terances.” (2015: 83). Consequently, they have to reject any pragmatic 
account of metaphor interpretation. The explanatory resources of tra-
ditional pragmatic theories cannot explain the alleged metaphorical 
meaning although it goes beyond the conventional rules of language.
If any pragmatic reasoning is ruled out, they must fi nd “a way of 
thinking about the inquiry that interlocutors pursue in conversation 
as completely governed by linguistic rules.” (2015: 6–7). Nevertheless, 
this is not bad news for them. They worry about the notion of meaning 
if we are too permissive with its use: “If we can locate metaphor else-
where, it is good news for meaning.” (2010: 179).
4. A Defense of Pragmatically Derived 
Metaphorical Meanings
Even if we agree on widening the scope of linguistic conventions and 
advocate for the distinctive character of novel metaphor interpretation, 
we think Lepore and Stone (2015) do not succeed in locating metaphor 
out of speaker meaning. In what follows, we give a pragmatic account 
for metaphor starting in 4.1 by giving the identifi cation conditions of 
metaphorical utterances. These conditions block the literal interpreta-
tion of metaphorical utterances and show that metaphorical utterances 
go beyond the conventional rules. Thus they are an argument against 
Stone and Lepore’s claim that our insights into metaphorical thinking 
are prompted just by the literal meanings of utterances.
We are aware that it is possible to accept our identifi cation con-
ditions and nevertheless hold that there is no metaphorical meaning. 
These conditions would merely prompt metaphorical thinking. Nev-
ertheless, in our opinion, they can trigger the search for inferential 
information to solve the communication problem that arises from 
blocking the literal interpretation. Linguists often present examples 
that provide evidence that the inferential system does indeed generate 
content beyond the encoded meaning, and that its operation is gram-
matically constrained (Vicente 2010). Since semantic composition rules 
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drive the composition process, going beyond these rules triggers the 
search of content that eventually allows the composition, and it is the 
job of pragmatics to supply the specifi c conceptual addition or modula-
tion. Modulation as required for metaphor will be considered in 4.2. 
In this section we expound how metaphorical thinking is a part of the 
interpretive context from which metaphorical provisional meanings 
are fi xed. They are constructed by means of one type of the pragmatic 
sub-tasks typically involved in ad hoc concept construction: language-
shifting.6 The language–shift involved in interpreting a metaphori-
cal utterance constitutes a new context of interpretation that at least 
delivers metaphorical meanings (ad hoc concepts) for the expressions 
used abnormally (non-conventionally) in the metaphorical utterance. 
Metaphorical meanings cannot exist without the metaphorical think-
ing from which they are conceived and thus the power of metaphor is 
not lost in their elaboration. Taking into account these metaphorical 
meanings, metaphorical utterances can convey propositional contents 
to agree or disagree, they can provide information that interlocutors 
add to the record.
4.1. Metaphorical Identifi cation
As we have claimed in our fi rst point of disagreement, we do not share 
the proposal that the analogical reasoning is triggered from the inad-
equacy of the literal meaning of the sentence as a whole when it is used 
metaphorically. For Lepore and Stone, the sentence used metaphori-
cally has a literal meaning which is inadequate. For us, there is no 
need to get to that absurd interpretation because, among other things, 
many metaphorical utterances cannot be literally grasped.
According to Lepore, at least as it is explained in Cappelen and 
Lepore,
any utterance succeeds in expressing an indefi nite number of propositions. 
One of these, the proposition semantically expressed, is easy to grasp. (2005: 
206)
But, in our opinion, there is no proposition easy to grasp at least in the 
fi rst part of an utterance of (1), (1a) 
(1a) Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra.
For a proposition to be graspable it must be intelligible. (1a) does not 
have the minimal level of meaningfulness to be propositional. Sub-
propositional expressions in (1a), for example ‘a snowmobile racing 
across the tundra’, give access to semantic information such as
6 Different types of pragmatic processes are accepted in current pragmatic 
theories. For example, Recanati (2004) accepts, in addition to context-shifting, 
pragmatic processes of enrichment, loosening and transfer in what is said.
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A snow mobile is a sport vehicle like a car on skis that you drive through 
the snow.
It’s fun; it’s exhilarating, and it gives a sense of adventure. A tundra is a frozen 
landscape with no trees, a place of relative safety. (Lepore and Stone 2014: 75)
Even the sub-propositional expression ‘the ice weasels’ in (1b), another 
sentence of (1),
(1b) At night the ice weasels come.
gives access to the semantic information also indicated by these au-
thors: “Weasels are small predatory animals known for their fi erceness 
and trickery.” (2014: 75). But no propositional information is achieved 
from the literal interpretation of (1a). We then strongly disagree with 
what Lepore and Stone add:
When you put this all together you imagine a prototypical course for a love 
affair, where it starts with a sense of adventure and excitement and then 
goes horribly wrong leaving you with a gnawing feelings of torture and pain. 
What seems to be doing the work here is our ability to understand the sen-
tence as described; and then to draw an analogy between the experience of 
being in love and a certain kind of history that could happen. (2014: 75, our 
emphasis)
What is doing the work here is by no means our ability to understand 
the sentences included in (1) as described! What is literally grasped in 
(1a) is the meaning of the sub-sentential and linguistically meaningful 
complex expression ‘a snowmobile racing across the tundra’. Even the 
sentences that follow (1a) in (1) are also literally grasped and could be 
compositionally added to the meaning of this complex NP. However, 
(1a) is semantically or literally unintelligible.
What we claim is that in the interpretation of sentences such as 
(1a) semantic composition is not available. Although (1a) is syntacti-
cally well-formed it lacks semantic coordination. There is a semantic 
mismatch since our semantic knowledge of the words ‘snowmobile’ 
and ‘love’ tells us that the composition of meaning is mediated by a 
semantic restriction in the word ‘snowmobile’ to the effect that its en-
coded concept (that denotes concrete objects to go on snow) cannot be 
normally used to talk about a feeling. The predicate ‘is a snowmobile 
racing across the tundra’ cannot make its semantic contribution to the 
clause since its meaning typically needs a concrete entity to fi ll in the 
semantic role of its subject and there is no element in (1a) with the fea-
ture [+concrete] to take such a role. As Asher says in relation to similar 
examples of semantic mismatch
These predications should be precluded by normal type constraints, and we 
know that there are no reference preserving maps (in this world) from goats 
to talking agents or from trees to talking agents. (Asher 2011: 284)
As the predication in (1a) is precluded by normal type constraints, no 
resulting meaning is available to obtain an acceptable literal proposi-
tion. Besides, if the proposition semantically expressed by (1a) has to 
be easy to grasp, there is no proposition semantically expressed by (1a).
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We must recognize that (1a) is a metaphor but the literal meaning 
of the sentence uttered cannot be the way of recognizing that (1a) is a 
metaphor since it cannot be obtained from the linguistic meaning of 
the sentence. What we know, as competent speakers, is that the term 
‘snowmobile’ is used in an abnormal way in (1a), it could be taken as 
a category mistake or a non-conventional use of the linguistic expres-
sion. We call this “contextual anomaly” (Romero and Soria 1997/98) or 
“contextual abnormality” (Romero and Soria 2005a, 2005b and 2007) 
and we defi ne it as the use of an expression in an unusual linguistic or 
extra-linguistic context. This means that there are two different modes 
of appearance of it:
(a) As an oddity between the terms uttered (as in the previous 
examples of novel metaphors: (1) and (5)–(7)).
(b) As an oddity between the occurrence of an expression in the 
actual unusual context and the implicit context associated 
to a normal use of this expression.
Abnormality of mode (b) is due to the incompatibility of the context of 
the utterance and the context conventionally associated to the uttered 
expressions. Let’s change the context in (4)
(4) [Sarah asks Marian where her pet is and she answers:] My cat is 
on the mat.
to obtain (4’).
(4’) [Marian is reading at home, and her one-year-old son is playing 
on a mat with something he found on the fl oor. Sarah, a friend 
who knows the kid is a real mummy’s boy enters the room and 
asks her where her son is. Marian answers:] My cat is on the mat.
Now there is a tension between ‘cat’ and the context. (4’) is an utterance 
that concerns a boy rather than a cat. This tension blocks the literal 
interpretation. The composition between CAT and THE SPEAKER depends 
on any salient relation in the context. The only salient relation is the 
relation of motherhood that the speaker has with her one-year-old son. 
If the tension mentioned did not block the literal composition, we would 
get to an unintelligible result: THE CAT THE SPEAKER IS MOTHER OF. Now 
the proposition semantically expressed is not easy to grasp because (4’) 
is not an utterance that concerns a cat. In our approach, our linguistic 
knowledge just guides us to semantic information but this information 
does not always have to lead by itself to a proposition semantically ex-
pressed by a sentence or its utterance.
Contextual abnormality is a necessary but not a suffi cient condition 
for metaphor. It is also present in metonymical utterances such as (8)
(8) [In a restaurant, a waiter asks a waitress what to do next and 
she answers:] The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.
An additional identifi cation criterion for metaphor is needed: a concep-
tual contrast. Conceptual contrast is the recognition that the speaker 
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is talking about a topic (target domain) using terms which normally 
describe another (source domain). This conceptual contrast occurs in 
(1a) but not in (8). In (1a) we detect as target domain the concept LOVE 
and as source domain the concept A SNOWMOBILE RACING ACROSS THE TUN-
DRA WHICH FLIPS OVER, PINS YOU UNDERNEATH AND LEAVES YOU EXPOSED TO ICE 
WEASELS AT NIGHT. In (4´), we detect as target domain the concept INFANT 
and as source domain the concept CAT.
Metaphorical identifi cation achieved by both contextual abnormal-
ity and conceptual contrast blocks the literal interpretation to avoid a 
route that leads to no propositional content semantically expressed and 
triggers the metaphorical mechanism. Although a demand for prag-
matic information is triggered by normal type constraints, the resolu-
tion of this situation cannot be treated as part of semantics. Neverthe-
less, this does not mean directly that no proposition can be conveyed by 
a metaphor as Lepore and Stone have argued (see section 3) and thus it 
is relevant to wonder if, by means of some conceptual adjustment in the 
interpretation of metaphorical utterances, some proposition can be ex-
pressed. Our positive answer depends on taking as input the evidence 
given by the speaker with her metaphorical utterance, which includes 
among other things the semantic information of sub-sentential expres-
sions, to construct the analogical correspondences that are relevant 
to get as output the intended proposition. This proposition includes a 
metaphorical provisional meaning.
4.2. A pragmatic account of metaphorical meanings
If we accept metaphorical meanings, we have to take into account 
several features in our proposal of speaker meaning. First, we cannot 
forget that speaker meaning is an occasion-meaning that, according 
to Grice at least, fi xes the occasion-meaning of the utterance and this 
may be non-conventional, as we argue metaphorical meaning is. Sec-
ond, non-conventional meanings can be considered ad hoc concepts. 
These are ubiquitous in human cognition and can be constructed liter-
ally and non-literally. Third, pragmatic theories admit different types 
of pragmatic processes in deriving the proposition expressed and one of 
them, the language-shift, permits us to get the metaphorical meaning 
without losing the cognitive power of metaphor.
As Grice (1957/89, 1968/89 and 1969/89) shows, speaker meaning is 
an occasion-meaning. In addition, it is the basic semiotic concept, the 
concept from which the semiotic concept of the occasion-meaning of the 
utterance-type can be defi ned. This occasion-meaning of the utterance-
type can coincide or not with one of its timeless meanings. If we con-
sider Grice’s example,
(9) If I shall then be helping the grass to grow, I shall have no time 
for reading.
we can point out that the timeless meaning of this “complete” utter-
ance-type could be specifi ed as ‘If I shall then be assisting the kind of 
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thing of which lawns are composed to mature, I shall have no time for 
reading’ or as ‘If I shall then be assisting the marijuana to mature, I 
shall have no time for reading’. The word ‘grass’ means ‘lawn-material’ 
or ‘marijuana’. But the speaker does not always mean by (9) one of 
these two timeless meanings. He could use (9) to mean ‘If I am then 
dead, I shall not know what is going on in the world’ and, in addition, 
‘one advantage of being dead will be that I shall be protected from the 
horrors of the world’. Nevertheless, the words ‘I shall be helping the 
grass to grow’ neither mean nor mean here ‘I shall be dead’. In this case 
the utterer’s occasion-meaning fi xes an occasion-meaning of an utter-
ance-type that does not coincide with one of the two timeless meaning 
of the words used (Grice 1969/89: 89–90). This means that occasion-
meaning does not have to be a timeless or a conventional meaning. 
Arbitrary conventions are very useful in communication, especially 
in verbal communication, but reducing verbal communication to the 
linguistic meaning or timeless meaning is simply unacceptable both 
on empirical and theoretical grounds. Since Grice’s use of the terms 
“occasion-meaning” or “speaker meaning”, which by now have become 
conventional, we can no longer claim that conventional meaning is the 
only kind of meaning we can speak of.
The nature of metaphorical meaning can be accounted for if, in the 
theory of meaning, it is accepted that there are non-conventional uses 
of words which may acquire provisional non-conventional meanings. 
In the case of metaphorical utterances, words mean what they con-
ventionally mean but speakers by using them convey propositions that 
involve new meanings for these words that are active only on the occa-
sion of the utterance; they are merely provisional and explainable as 
the result of a productive and systematic mechanism: analogical rea-
soning. Although it is usual to understand, following Grice (1975/89), 
that these new metaphorical meanings form a part of conversational 
implicatures, not even Grice has always kept that claim. If we attend 
to his distinction between formality and dictiveness (Grice 1987/89: 
361–362), we can recognize that there are cases of dictiveness without 
formality. Formality lets us know when the evaluated content belongs 
to the conventional part of the meaning of an expression while dictive-
ness discerns when a part of the content belongs to what is said. Grice 
exemplifi es this with two examples, one of them being a metaphor.
Suppose someone, in a suitable context, says ‘Heigh Ho’. It is possible that 
he might thereby mean something like “Well that’s the way the world goes”. 
Or again, if someone were to say “He’s just an evangelist”, he might mean, 
perhaps, “He is a sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-
grubber”. If in each case his meaning were as suggested, it might well be 
claimed that what he meant was in fact what his words said; in which case 
his words would be dictive but their dictive content would be nonformal and 
not part of the conventional meaning of the words used. We should thus fi nd 
dictiveness without formality. (Grice 1987/89: 361)
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If someone utters ‘He’s an evangelist’, what she means depends on 
what the words help us to say, although this does not coincide with its 
linguistic meaning, or part of its linguistic meaning. “Evangelist” does 
not conventionally mean ‘sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reaction-
ary, money-grubber’ and in using this word, the speaker changes its 
meaning provisionally.
A provisional meaning or an ad hoc concept is, according to Barsalou 
(1983), one that is made up on the spot for a particular purpose and it 
contrasts with a ready-made concept. Ready-made concepts are associ-
ated with familiar words and well-established categories. They produce 
organized and easily recoverable knowledge which resides in long term 
memory. But not all the concepts that a speaker can represent men-
tally are ready-made and it is plausible to suppose that entities can be 
categorized differently to achieve some relevant aim. Our ready-made 
categorizations and conceptualizations can give way to ad hoc categori-
zations and conceptualizations (Barsalou 1983 and 1985). In fact, ad hoc 
concepts are ubiquitous in human cognition. They are non-lexicalized 
concepts and include knowledge associated to categories created for the 
occasion of the utterance, which does not reside in long term memory.
There are some varieties of ad hoc concepts and they can be repre-
sented linguistically either literally where the words of a complex ex-
pression interact by compositional semantics or non-literally by means 
of a pragmatic adjustment of a concept (expressed by a lexicalized ex-
pression or by a complex expression). The ad hoc concept GOOD THINGS 
TO STAND ON TO CHANGE A LIGHT BULB may be expressed literally by means 
of a complex phrase ‘good things to stand on to change a light bulb’. 
In the same way, complex expressions such as ‘a snowmobile racing 
across the tundra and then suddenly it fl ips over, pinning you under-
neath. At night the ice weasels come’ express a literal ad hoc concept: A 
SNOWMOBILE RACING ACROSS THE TUNDRA WHICH FLIPS OVER, PINS YOU UNDER-
NEATH AND LEAVES YOU EXPOSED TO ICE WEASELS AT NIGHT. These concepts 
are “literal” in the sense that the words representing them keep their 
encoded meaning in the composition of the meaning of the phrase or 
extended text. But not all ad hoc concepts are literal, many of them can 
be constructed non-literally by a pragmatic adjustment of a literal con-
cept (Romero and Soria 2010). The inputs of metaphorical adjustments 
are concepts in general (lexicalized or ad hoc). Sometimes, as in (4’), a 
lexicalized concept, CAT, is the point of departure for an ad hoc meta-
phorical concept or metaphorical provisional meaning but, other times, 
as in (1), a literal ad hoc complex concept is the point of departure. In 
each case, the metaphorical adjustment results in an ad hoc concept 
with a complete different denotation which is one of the constituents 
of the proposition expressed by the metaphorical utterance. But how is 
this meaning obtained?
We normally interpret utterances with respect to the context, k, in 
which they take place. But it is not always appropriate for us to inter-
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pret them with respect to that context. On certain occasions we have to 
interpret them with respect to a context k’ distinct from the context in 
which it is actually uttered. Context-shift, from k to k’, is a pragmatic 
process and can be produced in several different ways, according to 
what aspect of context is shifted. If we represent a context, following 
Lewis (1980), as consisting of three parameters, a language, a situ-
ation, and a circumstance of evaluation, a context can be shifted by 
modifying one of these parameters. A context k is therefore analysed 
as a triple <L, s, c> where L is a language, s is a situation of utterance 
comprising a number of parameters corresponding to the situation of 
utterance (speaker, hearer, time, place, etc.), and c a circumstance of 
evaluation or a possible world.
There are examples of context-shifting which involve a situation-
shift, a world-shift, or a language-shift, but, given the aims of this ar-
ticle, we will focus only on a case of language-shift such as (10)
(10) [It is mutually known to the speaker and his addressee that 
Paul is wrong about the use of ‘paper session’ that he under-
stands with the meaning of ‘poster session’. The speaker says:] 
Paul says he’s due to present his work in the ‘paper session’.
In (10), the context-shift can be described by a language-shift because 
the speaker of (10) does not use the expression ‘paper session’ in its 
normal sense but in the sense that expression has in Paul’s idiolect, 
where it means the same as ‘poster session’ in its normal sense. Paul 
makes a deviant use of the phrase ‘paper session’. The expression with-
in the quotation marks, in this example, is not used with its standard 
meaning and so (10) has truth-conditions that differ completely from 
the truth-conditions of the utterance of the sentence when it does not 
include a quoted expression.
As we have argued, in metaphor there is also a language–shift 
(Romero and Soria 2007). This, in contrast to the one required for inter-
preting (10), is triggered by means of metaphorical identifi cation and 
is guided by the metaphorical mechanism, by the development of an 
analogical thinking or, as we have understood it following Indurkhya 
(1986), by a coherent partial mapping of a set of features from source 
domain to target domain to obtain a metaphorically restructured tar-
get domain. Some properties of the source domain (only those relevant 
to get information for the characterization of the subject matter) are 
used as a source of information to describe the target. As Lepore and 
Stone claim “Metaphorical thinking often requires us to fi nd many ana-
logical correspondences simultaneously.” (2015: 166).
Let’s see an example of a mapping to interpret (4’).The metaphorical 
mechanism links two separate cognitive domains in order to see one as 
the other: INFANT AS CAT. This link can be specifi ed with a mapping, M, 
from the source domain, CAT, to the target domain, INFANT. A domain can 
be represented by both a set of terms which make up its vocabulary 
and a set of structural constraints which specify how these terms are 
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related to the information associated with the concept as we can see for 
CAT and for INFANT in Figure 2.
Figure 2
CAT 
Ds = <Vs, Ss >
Vs = {‘cats’, ‘feline’, ‘walk’, ‘leg’, 
‘pet’, ‘play’, etc.}
Ss =
[1s] Cats are small domesticated 
feline mammals,
[2s] Cats have soft fur,
[3s] The colour of the fur of each 
breed of cats varies greatly, 
[4s] Cats play with anything 
available, 
[5s] Cats are pets, 
[6s] Pets need feeding and care, 
[7s] Cats walk on four legs,
[8s] Cats scrutinise things 
carefully,
[9s] Cats are aloof with the 
unknown,
[10s] Cats are often used to catch 
mice, etc.
INFANT
Dt = <Vt, St>
Vt = {‘infant’, ‘human being’, ‘play’, 
etc.}
St = 
[1t] Infants are young human 
beings,
[2t] Infants play with anything 
available,
[3t] Infants need feeding and care,
[4t] Infants are often unfriendly 
with the unknown,
[5t] At a certain stage, infants go on 
all fours,
[6t] Infants are at their early stage 
of their lives, etc.
The interpretation of (4´) entails fi nding a structural alignment between 
these domains. This alignment of consistent one-to-one correspondences 
allows the selection and partial mapping from a set of structural con-
straints from the source to the target domain. It is composed of a partial 
admissible function F from terms belonging to the source domain, argu-
ments of the function, to terms that belong or will belong to the target 
domain. To continue with our example, F could be formed with the pairs: 
(cat → infant), (walk on four legs → go on all fours), (pet → infant), (aloof 
→ unfriendly). The mapping is also composed of a subset of structural 
constraints of the source domain, S, which is coherently transformable 
by F to information associated with the target domain. In the example, 
S could be formed by structural constraints such as [4s], [6s], [7s], [8s], 
[9s] as we can see in the left column of Figure 3. These are transformable 
by F if each of its terms either belongs to the arguments of the admis-
sible partial function F or belongs to the vocabulary of target domain 
directly. On transforming these structural constraints, we come across 
other structural constraints only in terms of target domain as we can see 
in the right column of Figure 3.




[4s] Cats play with anything available, 
[6s] Pets need feeding and care, 
[7s] Cats walk on four legs,
[8s] Cats scrutinise things carefully,
[9s] Cats are aloof with the unknown-.
INFANTM or INFANT (AS CAT)
[2tM] Infants play with anything 
available, (highlights 2t)
[3tM] Infants need feeding and care, 
(highlights 3t)
[4tM] Infants are unfriendly with the 
unknown( highlights 4t) 
[5tM] Infants go on all fours, (highlights 
5t)
[8tM] Infants scrutinise things carefully 
(new, coming from 8s)
If the union of the transformation of S with part of the information of 
the target domain is consistent, that is to say, if this union is true under 
at least one model, then the structural constraints of S have been coher-
ently transformed by means of F in structural constraints of the target 
domain. Coherence is an inferential requirement for mappings: we can 
only transport the transformed information of the source domain that 
does not make our conception of target domain incoherent. The map-
ping M for (4’) generates a metaphorically restructured conception of 
INFANT, INFANTM or INFANT (AS CAT) characterized by the structural con-
straints in the right column of Figure 3. With [2tM], [3tM], [4tM], [5tM], 
nothing new is added to the target domain from the source domain 
but this target domain information is selected and reinforced by the 
relational similarities revealed by their alignment with the selected 
features in the source domain. As the information in [1t], [6t] (see the 
right column of Figure 2), is not selected, it is downplayed. In addition, 
when the description of the actual target domain is not aligned to the 
source domain in every feature, new information could be added to the 
target domain as it happens with [8tM]. Some similarities are created 
with metaphor.7 In metaphorical interpretation, the target concept is 
described by means of some source concept-like relational properties 
which strengthen some properties that the concept already had and, in 
the more creative cases, by means of new properties that are added as 
a result of the analogical adjustment.
The mapping is shaped guided by the search of the properties that 
will enable the hearer to obtain the intended interpretive effects. The 
hearer does not explore the implications of seeing one thing as another 
just guided by his imagination. Rather, he is guided by his attempt to 
recognize what correspondences the speaker is intending him to make. 
This is not by magic, of course. The speaker must choose her words in 
such a way that her utterance makes her intention recognizable under 
the circumstances. The hearer conceptualizes the target as intended on 
7 Black (1954), Indurkhya (1986), Romero and Soria (1997/98) and Bowdle and 
Gentner (2005) have argued for this proposal.
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the basis of the contextual evidence available, including the evidence 
provided by the speaker (both linguistic and non-linguistic), his previ-
ous world knowledge and personal experience, the specifi c situation, 
etc. Given the circumstances in (4’), Sarah can infer the analogical cor-
respondences intended by Marian. The mapping is guided by inferen-
tial requirements (coherence, contextual relevance and intention recog-
nition on the basis of the evidence provided) so that the target domain 
is provisionally restructured in the way the speaker envisioned and the 
parameter of language of the context of interpretation is shifted to k’ as 
intended by the speaker. In k’ new meanings are produced at least for 
the arguments of the function F where the metaphorical vehicle has to 
be included. INFANT (AS CAT) generates a new context of interpretation 
for (4’) where the word ‘cat’ stands for an improvised meaning; this ad 
hoc meaning is suffi ciently clear for the purposes of the conversation. 
The metaphorical provisional meaning of ‘cat’, the vehicle of metaphor, 
is the metaphorical provisional concept associated to ‘infant’ in that 
metaphorically restructured target domain, INFANT (AS CAT). The map-
ping approach allows us to know how certain words can change their 
meanings and what meanings they take on. This mechanism is used to 
produce non-conventional meanings in a systematic way, meanings or 
conceptions that are not lexicalized in the linguistic competence of the 
speakers of a linguistic community at that moment in the language. The 
cognitive power of metaphor often allows knowledge change (Gentner 
and Wolf 2000) and an increase of effability. We can entertain new con-
cepts and express meanings not yet available in the system of the lan-
guage and metaphorical utterances provide us with that expression.
By means of a language-shift, we can explain how the speaker can 
succeed in denoting when he uses the expression ‘my cat’ in (4’) to de-
note the speaker’s cat-like infant. The speaker in (4’) can convey the 
information that her infant (conceptualized as a cat, for example, as an 
infant who is on all fours and scrutinizes things carefully) is on the mat 
by composing that content from, among other things, the sub-proposi-
tional metaphorical meaning. This meaning permits us to determine 
what is metaphorically said by (4’). She coordinates with the hearer 
about the information that her infant (conceptualized as a cat) is on 
the mat. Thus, the ad hoc concept INFANT (AS CAT) in k’ can contribute 
information to the proposition that updates the conversational record. 
Sarah gets an answer to her question about her friend’s son, she gets 
accessible information about how things are. The metaphorical con-
ceptualization of one of the constituents of this proposition does not 
preclude the communication of a propositional content. What speaker 
and hearer cannot do is to coordinate on something her utterance does 
not concern, an imaginary cat and an imaginary mat, because when 
the hearer interprets an utterance such as (4’), both interlocutors know 
that the utterance concerns a real mat and a real boy.
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This is very different from what happens in an utterance of a joke. 
Let us see a joke about cats.8
(11) A policeman in the big city stops a man in a car with a Siberian 
Lynx in the front seat. ‘What are you doing with that Siberian 
Lynx?’ He exclaimed, ‘You should take it to the zoo.’ The follow-
ing week, the same policeman sees the same man with the cat 
again in the front seat, with both of them wearing sunglasses. 
The policeman pulls him over. ‘I thought you were going to take 
that cat to the zoo!’ The man replied, ‘I did. We had such a good 
time we are going to the beach this weekend!’
If we compare the uses of the expression ‘cat’ in (4’) and in the joke 
(11), we see that the joke does not concern a situation that includes any 
denotatum, it is a fi ctional situation with humorous intent. The hearer 
does not add to the record the information that a particular driver is 
going to the beach with his cat. The speaker is joking by exploiting the 
ambiguity of the linguistic expression ‘taking someone to the zoo’. In 
jokes, we are presented with an idea or situation that is followed by 
an ambiguity or a twist, resolved in a clever way, simply to produce 
amusement while metaphorical utterances can and often do support 
inquiry. In (4’), we do have a particular boy denoted metaphorically by 
‘my cat’ and a particular mat denoted literally by ‘the mat’.
We would readily accept Lepore and Stone’s (2010: 171) claim that 
in certain jokes, the sentences that the speaker uses mean that p but 
the point of the speaker is not to contribute information seriously to 
their interaction. However, to explain metaphor in this way is highly 
misleading. We do not think that the main point of the metaphorist 
is not to contribute information seriously to the conversation. Lepore 
and Stone can show a similarity between metaphor and jokes with (1) 
because this example is a humorous utterance by a comedian. In (1) 
the twist is presented and cleverly resolved by metaphorical proposi-
tions. Love is metaphorically described as a very positive and exciting 
experience (something that is widely accepted), however, it turns out 
to be a very negative and distressful one at the end of the sentence. 
In this case, the main point of the utterance is to produce amusement 
by the twist of the unexpected view of love in those negative terms. If 
taken as a joke, the speaker of (1) is not contributing the metaphorical 
proposition seriously. The joke is metaphorically told. If we did not get 
the mapping as intended, we would not get the metaphorical proposi-
tions and the humorous effect. We do not think, however, that meta-
phorical jokes should be the type of discourse selected if we want to fi nd 
out whether the metaphorist can contribute information that supports 
inquiry. If that is the goal, it would be better to consider if the speaker 
can seriously use metaphorical utterances to answer questions, if she 
can agree or disagree about something that matters to the interlocu-
8 Example taken from a google search: http://www.jokes4us.com/animaljokes/
catjokes.html.
166 E. Romero, B. Soria, Against Lepore and Stone’s Sceptic Account
tors, since these are examples of utterances that typically support in-
quiry.9 With metaphorical utterances interlocutors can seriously an-
swer questions as in (4’). With a joke, by contrast, interlocutors do not 
identify questions that matter to them and they do not work to reach 
agreement about the answers.
Metaphorical utterances provide us with a content that can be ne-
gated while it would be absurd to negate a joke. Lepore and Stone’s 
view of metaphor as just showing similarities is of no use to explain the 
difference between the interpretive effects of a metaphorical utterance 
and its negation. In metaphor, content is provided in an unusual way. 
But this is by no means a reason to reject that it is publicly accessible. 
Interpreting Donne’s metaphor (12)
(12) No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the 
continent, a part of the main.
involves triggering new interpretations for ‘island’ and ‘continent’. This 
does not miss the breadth and interconnections of Donne’s imagery be-
cause the new meanings for ‘island’ and ‘continent’ depend on the met-
aphorical concept PEOPLE AS GEOGRAPHICAL PLACES and more particularly 
on HUMAN CONNECTIONS AS GEOGRAPHICAL CONNECTIONS, metaphorical con-
cepts that act as part of the metaphorical context for the interpretation 
of (12). Without this new context of interpretation, characterized by a 
new conception of the target domain, it is not possible to conceive the 
metaphorical meanings for ‘island’ and ‘continent’. The propositions 
that no man is an island and that every man is a piece of the continent 
are only conceivable from this new context. These propositions have 
truth-conditions. They indicate what the world must be like for the 
metaphorical propositions conveyed by (12) to be true. The former is 
true if and only if no object within the extension of the concept MAN be-
longs to the extension of the concept MAN (AS ISLAND). The latter is true if 
and only if every object within the extension of the concept MAN, also be-
longs to the extension of the concept MAN (AS CONTINENT). And speakers 
9 The role of metaphor in science, a clear case of speakers supporting inquiry, 
is well known to metaphor theorists. Gentner and Wolf (2000) explain how in the 
history of the scientifi c account of the atom, several metaphorical models have 
restructured the concept of atom: Wilson’s plum-pudding model and Nagaoka’s 
Saturnian-disk model guided Rutherford’s research and fi nally led to incorporation 
of orbits as in the Rutherford-Bohr’s solar-system model of the atom. Metaphorical 
content is publicly available, it is communicated and has an important role in 
knowledge change. This conceptualization of the atom allows utterances such as 
‘electrons travel in circular orbits around the nucleus’ which include terms (‘travel’, 
‘orbit’) of the source domain SOLAR SYSTEM with a transferred meaning and which 
makes it possible to “seriously” communicate the metaphorical proposition intended 
by the scientist. At Bohr’s time, when the term ‘orbit’ was used to talk about the 
earth, it did not mean the same as when it was used to talk about the atom. The term 
‘orbit’ contributes to the proposition with the metaphorical provisional meaning 
that was constructed for the utterance in the target domain ATOM (AS SOLAR SYSTEM). 
In this way, the speaker can convey propositions about the structure of the atom 
conceptualized as a solar system.
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can agree or disagree with respect to these metaphorical propositions 
directly communicated by (12) as we can see in (13), an excerpt from 
the very beginning of the fi lm About a boy, where we fi nd the opinion of 
Will, the main character, expressed in the following way: 
(13) If I may say so, [that no man is an island is] a complete load of 
bollocks.
Will disagrees with Donne’s claim in (12). He denies that no man is an 
island, he denies that no object within the extension of the concept MAN 
belongs to the extension of the concept MAN (AS ISLAND). If the purpose 
of metaphorical utterance were, as Lepore and Stone claim, just to see 
the analogies created by PEOPLE AS GEOGRAPHICAL PLACES, how can the 
interpretive effects of the similarity be negated? We do not know how 
negative metaphors such as no man is an island can be explained from 
their account as it is quite absurd to negate that there is not a similar-
ity that you have already entertained. With Lepore and Stone’s view 
of metaphor as an invitation to see one thing as another and nothing 
more, it is not possible to explain the difference between what Donne 
and Will say respectively.10
With (12) and (13), the same metaphorical concept MAN (AS ISLAND) is 
prompted. The difference of their interpretive effects is merely that one 
asserts what the other denies. From our standpoint, we can say that we 
can interpret both (12) and (13) from the same metaphorical context k’ 
and thus their speakers “metaphorically say” the opposite.
The opinion of Will is not exhausted by (13) and he adds (14).
(14) a.  In my opinion, all men are islands. 
 b. And what’s more, now’s the time to be one. 
   This is an island age. 
   A hundred years ago, you had to depend on other people. 
   No one had TV or CDs or DVDs or videos... 
   ...or home espresso makers. 
   As a matter of fact, they didn’t have anything cool. 
   Whereas now, you see... 
   ...you can make yourself a little island paradise. 
   With the right supplies and the right attitude... 
   ...you can be sun-drenched, tropical, a magnet... 
   ...for young Swedish tourists. 
   (…)
   And I like to think that perhaps I am that kind of island.
   I like to think I’m pretty cool. 
   I like to think I’m Ibiza.
He starts with (14a), a metaphorical utterance that expresses the prop-
osition that all men are islands. This is true if and only if every object 
10 We are aware that, being a case of fi ction, Will is not a real speaker, and the 
speaker meaning is really the meaning intended by the script author. However, we 
would like to use the example as if it were a real speaker. After all, this is what we 
usually do when we exemplify a proposal on speaker meaning.
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within the extension of the concept MAN also belongs to the extension of 
MAN (AS ISLAND). He does not only deny (12) with (14a) but he also goes 
further saying that all men are islands. In addition, to interpret (14b), 
where the expressions in bold letters represent terms that come from 
the vocabulary of the source domain, involves a progressive alignment 
to elaborate a new mapping that results in the metaphorically restruc-
tured concept WILL (AS THAT KIND OF ISLAND). The source domain has 
become a more specifi c ad hoc concept AN ISLAND THAT IS SUN-DRENCHED, 
TROPICAL, A MAGNET…FOR YOUNG SWEDISH TOURISTS and the target is a spe-
cifi c man, WILL. This idea of progressive alignment of more specifi c as-
pects in the domains allows us to provide an explanation of extended 
novel metaphors that other pragmatic approaches cannot provide. In 
addition, it permits us to argue that the similarity the metaphorist 
invites us to construct depends on the recognition of his intention to 
get across the intended effects from a certain set of specifi c analogical 
correlations within the domains. He acts in a way that helps the audi-
ence to know what analogous properties of ISLAND will serve to describe 
a specifi c MAN.
The script writer of the fi lm presents the fi ction as an example of 
how a man can be a metaphorical island. The whole fi lm is a meta-
phorical argument to show disagreement with Donne’s metaphorical 
proposition that no man is an island. By showing Will’s life, the script 
writer is providing an example of a MAN (AS ISLAND) with its peculiar 
characteristic as an individual, WILL (AS THAT KIND OF ISLAND). Interlocu-
tors in the fi lm identify a metaphorical question that matters to them 
and work to reach agreement about the answers.
When later on in the fi lm, someone tells Will ‘you can’t shut life out. 
No man is an island’, another friend exclaims: ‘She’s right, you know. 
Yeah, she is’, and Will replies:
(15) No, she’s not! She’s wrong!
 Some men are islands. I’m a bloody island!
 I’m bloody Ibiza!
Will is insisting on his disagreement with a metaphorical proposition 
rather than making us perceive a similarity that we already had. Meta-
phorical propositions contribute to the conversational record. They con-
tribute information in the sense of public content that underwriters 
interlocutors’ joint inquiry into how things are.
When Lepore and Stone metaphorically defend that metaphor 
should not be on the scoreboard we understand what they mean and we 
disagree. In their book, the concept to build their central claim about 
what constitutes propositional content is metaphorically constructed. 
By doing this they have constructed a view of what is communicated as 
what can be registered in a (baseball) scoreboard and this metaphori-
cal conceptualization of the conversational record can be part of the 
propositional contents they convey in their subsequent inquiry about 
communication. We understand their proposal, among other things, 
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from the analogical construction of the ad hoc concept, CONVERSATIONAL 
RECORD (AS A BASEBALL SCOREBOARD), in the way intended by them. The 
metaphorical concept is a part of the propositions conveyed. Metaphori-
cal communication is successful only if we map the right features from 
source to target as intended by the speakers. In their works, ‘score-
board’ is used with a metaphorical provisional meaning. Meaning that 
is possible in the new shifted context that its mapping provides and 
that can contribute to the propositions intended by the speakers (phi-
losophers in search of truth rather than poets or comedians).
In this way, our position eliminates the diffi culties that, according 
to Lepore and Stone, any non-sceptic account on metaphorical mean-
ing share. In addition, our position provides both an effective proposal 
on metaphorical identifi cation that appeals to sub-propositional condi-
tions and a proposal about how to obtain metaphorical propositions 
that, without losing the power of metaphor, permits us to explain the 
speakers’ agreements or disagreements when metaphorical utterances 
are involved. If we have a systematic metaphorical mechanism to com-
bine encoded meaning and contextual information, our communication 
system is more powerful (increases the scope of generativity) and plau-
sible (in terms of language acquisition and language change). Thus, 
we do not see in what sense, locating metaphor elsewhere can be “good 
news for meaning”. As long as we stand clear about encoded meaning, 
linguistic composition rules and the linguistic constraints in relation to 
the demands of contextual information, we see no offense to semantics 
in talking about metaphorical propositional contents as part of speaker 
meaning (conceived as a combination of linguistically encoded, seman-
tically constrained and contextually inferred information). As we ac-
knowledge the important role of semantic constraints on the demand of 
contextual information marked in our metaphorical identifi cation, our 
view coincides with Lepore and Stone’ defense of a wider effect of lin-
guistic rules on speaker meaning but this does not lead us to a sceptic 
approach to metaphorical meaning.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have challenged Lepore and Stone’s sceptic account 
on metaphor. We argue for metaphorical meaning as a variety of pro-
visional meanings (ad hoc concepts) constructed by an analogical map-
ping and triggered by sub-propositional identifi cation conditions.
By rejecting their claim that the metaphorical use of language is 
related, as any other, just to the literal meaning, our position provides 
an explanatory proposal on metaphorical identifi cation which appeals 
to sub-propositional conditions: contextual abnormality and conceptual 
contrast. Utterances that are identifi ed as metaphorical block the liter-
al meaning of the sentence and trigger a pragmatic mechanism used to 
generate new conceptions of concepts (target concepts) resorting to con-
ceptual mappings. The production and interpretation of metaphorical 
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utterances is not exhausted simply by entertaining the metaphorical 
concept (seeing one concept as another). These new conceptions change 
the interpretation context of the utterance in the language parameter. 
From this new interpretation context, provisional metaphorical mean-
ings are determined for words, phrases or even extended discourses 
used as metaphorical vehicles in the utterance: they are the meaning 
of their counterparts in the metaphorically restructured target domain. 
These meanings, since they are determined in the new context of in-
terpretation generated by the analogical thinking, are constituents of 
what is explicitly communicated to get the metaphorical proposition-
al content communicated by the metaphor. What is asserted by the 
speaker is a propositional content in a new context. Thus the power 
of metaphor, its capacity to prompt the hearer to see one thing as an-
other, is not lost.
In addition, our position provides a pragmatic account of how to 
obtain metaphorical propositions that permits us to explain the speak-
ers’ agreements or disagreements when metaphorical utterances are 
involved. In doing this, a theory of meaning needs to take into account 
something more than simply conventional meaning.
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